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Thow shalt loue the Lord thi God of al thin herte, and of al thi soule, and of alle thi strengthis.1 
 
Deut. 6.5 
 
In Part One of the Repressor of Over Much Blaming of the Clergy (c. 1449), Reginald Pecock outlines 
in detail the foundations on which his defence of orthodox practices against Lollard attack will 
be built. The last of these foundations, which he terms ‘general profis’, is comprised of three 
rules from which he draws four conclusions.2 The first is grounded in the biblical commandment 
of caritas, first articulated in the Pentateuch but established as the Great Commandment in the 
New Testament, that a man should (in Pecock’s modified rendering) ‘loue God and drede God 
                                                          
My thanks to the anonymous readers for SAC, and to Sebastian Sobecki and Sarah Salih for their 
careful readings of this essay; to Eva von Contzen for guidance on translations from Latin; and 
to audiences at Cornell, Oxford and Cambridge whose comments have been valuable in shaping 
my argument. 
1 The Holy Bible, Containing the Old and New Testaments, with the Apocryphal Books, ed. Josiah Forshall 
and Frederic Madden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1850). 
2 Reginald Pecock, The Repressor of Over Much Blaming of the Clergy, ed. Churchill Babington, Rerum 
Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores 19 (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 
1860; Kraus Reprint, 1966), p. 110. 
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with al his herte, soul, and strengthe’.3 The second conclusion is that a man ‘must bithinke and 
remembre’ seven matters: who God is; the ‘benefetis’ He gives to man; the punishments He 
dispenses; the articles of His law and service; how man should serve God in these points; man’s 
natural frailty and disposition to sin; the sins and their remedies. The third conclusion is that 
active knowledge of these seven matters is a prerequisite for the first:  
the remembraunce and mynde taking upon these vij. maters is so necessarie a meene into 
the loue and drede of God, that withoute meditacioun and mynde vpon hem or upon 
summe of hem no man schal loue God and drede God in eny while with al his herte, 
soule, and strengthe.4  
A man cannot love God ‘with al his herte, soule, and strengthe’, so the syllogism demonstrates, 
without having in mind some part of the knowledge of Him encompassed in those ‘vij. maters’. 
This command to love God thus requires a knowledge of Him that is hard work to obtain, not 
least because God is materially absent. In the Repressor, Pecock argues that the particular difficulty 
of knowing God in order to love Him can be overcome through the dual labours of learning and 
recollection. But such is man’s natural frailty that he cannot recall and keep in mind these 
matters without the help of the following ‘weies or meenes’: reading or hearing Scripture and 
other writings; hearing sermons; ‘biholding upon picturis or purtraturis or graued werk or coruun 
[carven] werk’; and visiting places where holy men did or do dwell, or where their relics and 
‘relifis [remains]’ are housed.5 The fourth conclusion is thus that the problems of God’s absence 
and man’s forgetfulness are partly counteracted not only through teaching and the written word, 
but also through physical actions and material objects that mediate, or become proxies for, forms 
of presence. The efficacy of these means is predicated on an understanding of the reliance of 
human cognition on sensory perception. Pilgrimages, sacred relics and images (paintings, 
                                                          
3 Repressor, pp. 113-14. Pecock offers a subtle rewriting of scriptural authority here by combining 
the injunction to ‘drede God’ with the command to love Him. 
4 Ibid, p. 114. 
5 Ibid. 
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portraits, engravings, sculptures) – though highly suspect to Lollards – are all, Pecock posits, 
tools key to the work of learning and remembrance that generates the knowledge of God 
necessary to obey the greatest biblical commandment.6 As such, they operate not only through 
an appeal to sight, but also, as this essay explores, to the sense of touch. 
The algorithm of knowledge, remembrance and love, upon which the Repressor’s 
arguments against Lollardy rest, is also the explicit foundation of a number of Pecock’s surviving 
works that have the broader aim of offering orthodox instruction in the vernacular for laity and 
clergy alike (The Donet, 1443-49, The Reule of Crysten Religioun, 1443 and The Folewer to the Donet, 
1453-54).7 Since, as the Reule makes clear, ‘love may not be had anentis [towards] eny persoone 
wiþoute knowing had afore vpoun þe same persoone’, Pecock’s works systematically tabulate 
and categorise the knowledge necessary to know God in order to love Him.8 In these works 
(though not explicitly in the Repressor), the Christian imperative to love God, but also, per the 
second part of the commandment of caritas, to love one’s neighbour as one’s self, is expressed as 
friendship and the kind of love required as ‘freendful’ or ‘freendly’.9 Charity itself is defined as 
‘not ellis þanne an habit or a dede of freendly louyng to god, or a wel willing to god aboue alle 
þingis, and to alle oþire resonable and sauable creaturis in god and for god’.10 Pecock’s thinking 
                                                          
6 This claim is repeated elsewhere in Pecock’s works. See, for example, Reginald Pecock, The 
Reule of Crysten Religioun, ed. William Cabell Greet, EETS o.s. 171 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1927; Millwood, N.Y.: Kraus Reprint, 1987), p. 244. 
7 Two other works survive, Poore Mennis Myrror (c. 1443-49) and The Book of Faith (c. 1456). On 
Pecock’s target audience in his works, see further Mishtooni Bose, ‘Religious Authority and 
Dissent’, A Companion to Medieval English Literature and Culture, ed. Peter Brown (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2007), pp. 40-55. 
8 Reule, p. 2. The Donet, for example, organises the knowledge necessary for Christian life into four 
tables, explicitly related to the strands of the commandment to love God, neighbour and self. See 
further Kirsty Campbell, The Call to Read: Reginald Pecock’s Books and Textual Communities (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), for outlines of the various modes of 
categorisation employed across Pecock’s works, e.g. p. 22. 
9 The instances are numerous. See Reginald Pecock, The Donet, ed. Elsie Vaughan Hitchcock, 
EETS o.s. 156 (London: Oxford University Press, 1921; New York: Kraus Reprint, 1971), e.g. 
pp. 28, 34, 36, 37, 42, etc. For the Reule, see for example, pp. 239, 241, 242, 496, etc. 
10 Donet, p. 109. 
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thus follows Thomas Aquinas who influentially expounds charity in the Summa theologiae, in a 
thoroughly Aristotelianised understanding, as ‘a friendship of man and God’.11  
The requirements of caritas thus to some extent underpin Pecock’s entire literary project, 
and its expression as friendship is central to works like the Donet, the Folewer and the Reule.12 
While the paradigm of friendship for caritas is left largely implicit in the Repressor, it surfaces 
compellingly in his defence of images. Pecock’s long discussion of images in the Repressor 
culminates in the idea of Christ as an absent friend, an image of whom offers the Christian a 
form of presence essential to meeting the difficult demands of charity.13 Pecock sets out the 
argument thus:  
                                                          
11 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, gen. ed. Thomas Gilby, 60 vols. (London: Blackfrairs, 
1975), 2a2æ.23, 1 (XXXIV, 6-7). Thomas deals with the theological virtue of charity as friendship 
extensively in 2a2ae, questions 23 through 46, where, as the translator notes, he understands 
charity as ‘whole-hearted love of God’ that includes love of self and neighbour as set out in the 
biblical commandments (p. xvii). Nathan Lefler gives a thoroughgoing account of Thomas’s 
theology of friendship and its debt to Aristotle in Theologizing Friendship: How Amicitia in the 
Thought of Aelred and Aquinas Inscribes the Scholastic Turn (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2014). On the 
influence of Thomas on Pecock, see further Campbell, The Call to Read, e.g. pp. 12-13 and 
Chapter Five. See also, Mishtooni Bose, ‘Two Phases of Scholastic Self-Consciousness: 
Reflections on Method in Aquinas and Pecock’, Aquinas as Authority, ed. P. J. J. van Geest 
(Leuven: Peeters, 2002), pp. 87-107. 
12 As Pecock explains in the Donet, Christ’s ‘two tables’ are three-fold, defining an ethics of love 
towards God, self and neighbour. Fulfilment of the command in these three areas means the 
‘remenaunt’ of God’s law will also be fulfilled, p. 17 (cf. Reule, e.g. p. 240). It is this three-fold 
application of Christ’s commandments that governs Pecock’s categorisation of the whole of 
God’s law into three tables understood to encapsulate all ‘eendal’ moral virtues. A fourth table 
(placed first) contains the ‘meenal’ virtues. These ‘meenal’ virtues accord with the seven matters 
that the Repressor and the Reule set out as the means to fulfilling the commandment to love 
wholeheartedly; these seven matters, in turn, can be reduced to Christ’s two tables and are 
comprehended fully in Pecock’s four tables. These four tables are intended to encapsulate and 
ultimately replace the existing multiple tabulations relating to God’s law, such as the Decalogue, 
the cardinal virtues, the seven deadly sins, and so on. The Donet lays out the four tables; the 
Folewer, intended as an extension of the Donet, gives an extended justification of the four tables in 
Part 2. Both the seven matters and the four tables will teach that God is worthy to be loved with 
the love of friendship above all others, and instruct how to love God, self and neighbour with 
the pure love of friendship. See, for examples, Reule, p. 239; The Folewer to the Donet, ed. Elsie 
Vaughan Hitchcock, EETS o.s. 164 (London: Oxford University Press, 1924, Kraus reprint, 
1981), p. 194, etc. 
13 The analysis of this episode in this essay builds substantially on my earlier discussion made in 
‘Reading Without Books’, Spaces for Reading in Later Medieval England, ed. Mary C. Flannery and 
Carrie Griffin (New York: Palgrave, 2016), pp. 115-31. 
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Ech man hath nede forto haue gode affecciouns anentis [towards] Crist, as upon his best 
freend; and this freend зeueth [gives] not to us his presence visibili; wherfore it is 
profitable to ech man for to ymagine this freend be present to us bodili and in a maner 
visibili. And sithen herto serueth ful weel and ful myche the ymage of Crist crucified.14 
The need for love (‘gode affecciouns’) for Christ the friend is potentially compromised by the 
absence of presence, that is, by the absence of sensibles: ‘this freend зeueth not to us his 
presence visibili’. An imagined image, supported by a physical ‘ymage of Crist crucified’, 
however, can serve to mediate friendship with Christ. The underlying logic here follows that of 
the ‘general profis’ of Part 1, which establish images as one of the ‘meenes’ or instruments 
through which a man is able to recollect the knowledge required to obey the commandment to 
‘loue thi Lord God of al thin herte’. As I suggest in this essay, Pecock’s use of the figure of 
Christ as friend in his defence of images is the logical extension of an Aristotelianised 
understanding, worked out across his corpus, of the command to love God. But so too is it 
rooted in an Aristotelianised theory of the operation of the imagination and of sensory 
perception, and of their key roles in mitigating absence and mediating presence. Together, 
Aristotelian theories of friendship and of sensory perception provide Pecock with his most 
affectively charged arguments as to why Christians need images.  
Pecock’s broader defence of images is thus framed with a particular set of concerns: the 
human desire for presence and the problem of absence; the role played by imagination and 
memory in making that which is absent present; and, finally, imagination’s and memory’s a priori 
reliance on sensory perception. Orthodox defenders of images justify the use of physical images 
in part on the grounds that they act as a stabilizer for the sense of sight, and so also for the 
imaginative and memory practices at the heart of late-medieval piety.15 As Shannon Gayk has 
                                                          
14 Repressor, p. 269. 
15 See Kathleen Kamerick, Popular Piety and Art in the Late Middle Ages: Image Worship and Idolatry in 
England 1350-1500 (New York: Palgrave, 2002), e.g. p. 158. 
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described, Pecock similarly advocates images as props for vision and visual images drawn in the 
imagination.16 Pecock’s engagement with Aristotelian friendship, however, with its emphasis on 
presence and proximity, also facilitates his advocacy of the value of the physical image’s appeal to 
the sense of touch. If a reader accepts his reasoning as to why an image enables a man to love 
Christ in His absence, Pecock says in concluding his defence of image use, then he or she also 
has ‘sufficient ground forto excuse fro blame’ those who ‘touche with her hondis the feet and 
othere parties and the clothis of ymagis, and wolen thanne aftir sette to her visage and to her 
iзen and to her mouthis her tho hondis’.17 The utility of the image – and specifically the three-
dimensional image, with ‘parties’ and ‘clothis’ – is not therefore just in the visual image it affords 
to the sense of sight, but also in the tangible experience it mediates to the sense of touch: the 
same logic that allows a Christian to use an image as a proxy to see Christ in His absence, allows 
that he or she use it likewise to touch Him. Pecock’s intervention in the controversy over images 
thus moves beyond the traditional terms of the written word versus the visual image, or of 
images as libri laicorum, to the relationship of material images to mental ones, and thereby out to a 
broader consideration of the structures of human cognition and sensation.18 By thinking about 
the problem of images through the figure of the friend, Pecock makes a powerful claim: in 
substituting for that which is absent, the image mimetically offers presence in ways that 
structures an ethics central to caritas, not just of vision, but also of touch. 
 
Pecock’s Repressor 
                                                          
16 Shannon Gayk, Image, Text, and Religious Reform in Fifteenth-Century England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 167. Cf. the discussion of Thomas Hoccleve, Chapter 2. 
17 Repressor, p. 270. 
18 See Chapter 5 in Image, Text, and Religious Reform, e.g. p. 156 on Pecock’s contribution to the 
debate on the relationship of the visual image to the written word, and on images as books for 
the illiterate. 
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The Repressor targets a group of the laity that have fallen into error; more specifically, ‘tho erring 
persoones of the lay peple whiche ben clepid Lollardes’.19 Following the general proofs of Part 1, 
Parts 2 through 5 of the Repressor offer the ‘special maner’ of proofs with which Pecock defends 
the eleven ‘gouernauncis of the clergie’ attacked  by Lollards.20 The first of these governances, 
‘hauyng and vsing of ymagis’, pertains to a more general use of images in Christian practice; the 
second, concerning pilgrimages ‘to dyuerse bodies and bonys of Seintis’ and ‘to ymagis of Crist 
crucified and of Marie and of othere Seintis’, attends to pilgrimage and the more specific role of 
images and relics as the object of pilgrimage.21 For Lollards, Christians who venerate ‘dead’ 
images run the risk of falling into idolatry, as well as of erring in belief. While some Lollards 
allow the use of a ‘pore crucifix’ (as did John Wyclif) on the grounds that Christ took bodily 
form, images of the Trinity are instead held to lead to misunderstandings of the nature of God.22 
Another source of anxiety was the imputation of miraculous powers to images themselves. From 
a Lollard perspective, the proclivity displayed by some for touching images is evidence of both 
belief in their inherent power (which might be conveyed through touch) and of idolatry. One 
early fifteenth-century Lollard text thus registers unease at the spectacle of Christians clinging to 
images, caressing and kissing them, as if they were really those they represent: some ‘lewid 
folc…cleuen sadly strokande and kyssand þese olde stones and stokkis, laying doun hore grete 
                                                          
19 Repressor, pp. 127-8. On the Repressor’s imagined audience, see further, Campbell, Call to Read, p. 
28; and Bose, ‘Religious Dissent’, p. 41. ‘Lollardy’, of course, represents a more diverse (and 
sometimes conflicting) set of beliefs and practices than the use of a single term for heterodoxy in 
the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries suggests. 
20 Repressor, p. 4. The eleven are: image use, pilgrimages, church ownership of property, the 
hierarchy of priests, the authority of the pope, ‘dyuersite and nouelte’ in strictness and forms of 
religious rule, prayer to saints, the cost of furnishing church interiors, practices concerning signs 
and sacraments, oath-swearing and the use of the death sentence. See further on Lollard and 
orthodox beliefs, Margaret Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, Volume I: Laws Against Images (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1988); and for Lollardy in Pecock’s works in particular, see Kantik Ghosh, ‘Bishop 
Reginald Pecock and the Idea of “Lollardy”’, Text and Controversy from Wyclif to Bale: Essays in 
Honour of Anne Hudson, ed. Helen Barr (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), pp. 251-65.  
21 Repressor, pp. 136; 175. 
22 Margaret Aston, Lollards and Reformers: Images and Literacy in Late Medieval Religion (London: 
Hambledon Press, 1984), pp. 136-41 (for Wyclif’s views, see, e.g. p. 138). 
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offryngis…as зif þei weren Crist and oure Lauedy and Ion Baptist and Thomas of Caunterbery 
and siche oþer’.23 Such tactile habits not only misdirect affection, but also time, money and 
materials – away from God and from charitable giving to the poor, who are living images of 
Christ, to the clergy and the church.24 In broad terms, the defence Pecock makes in the Repressor 
to these and other Lollard conclusions about images is a conventional one: Scripture, reason and 
moral law (the threefold authority Pecock tests each governance against) do not forbid, but 
rather approve, that images be used – not, as Lollards fear, as objects of worship – but as 
‘rememoratijf or mynding signes’.25 Having established the lawfulness of image use for the 
purpose of recollection and remembrance, Pecock then proceeds to detail fifteen Lollard 
objections to these two governances, before refuting each objection in turn. That his arguments 
about the lawfulness of image use culminate in a powerful defence of those who caress and kiss 
images registers not only the strength of Lollard objection to touching images, but also the 
under-recognised importance of touch to medieval understandings of memory, cognition and 
love.  
Three particular Lollard objections (13-15) form a unit that Pecock notes need special 
attention in refuting: by praying to, bowing to or kissing a cross, a person takes the cross to be a 
god.26 While these actions may be performed by a Christian in private devotion, they are all 
variously mandated in liturgy: one prays to the cross, for example, when the hymn Vexilla regis 
prodeunt (‘the banners of the king advance’) is sung in the Passion week; one bows to a cross in 
the Palm Sunday procession; and one kisses a cross (as the culmination of creeping to it) on 
Good Friday. Pecock is thus concerned to ‘assoile’ (resolve or refute) these objections because 
                                                          
23 British Library MS Additional 24202, ff. 26-8v, edited in Anne Hudson, ed., Selections from 
English Wycliffite Writings (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), p. 87. 
24 See further, Gayk, Image, Text, and Religious Reform, chapter 1, for a nuanced discussion of the 
spectrum of Lollard beliefs about images. See also Hudson, ed., Selections from English Wycliffite 
Writings, e.g. p. 27. 
25 See e.g. Repressor, pp. 136-7. 
26 Ibid, p. 207. Objection thirteen is detailed at pp. 199-202; fourteen at pp. 202-7; and fifteen at 
pp. 207-8. 
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some ‘wijters’ (blamers or critics, i.e. Lollards), are ‘out of eese [disturbed]’ when they must 
participate in these communal performances.27 To explain the way in which prayer to a cross 
does not automatically make a god of it, Pecock makes recourse to ‘colouris of rethorik’: 
Scripture uses (as everyday speech does) figurative language, such as the synecdoche and the 
metonym, which shows how we can address the cross but in fact be directing our petition or 
worship to Christ.28 To answer ‘the xiiije. and xve. argumentis to gidere vndir oon’ – that is, the 
charges that bowing to and kissing an image makes a god of it – Pecock first sets out three rules. 
It is here, perhaps unexpectedly, though entirely in line with the logic of the requirements of 
caritas, that the paradigm of friendship surfaces.  
The first of these rules is that:  
a man schal haue more feruentli hise affecciouns and loues anentis his loued freend, 
whanne and whilis thilk freend is at sumwhile present personali with him and bisidis him, 
than he schal haue, if the freend be absent alwey and not personali present.29  
The axiom on which Pecock’s argument rests predicates the affection necessary for friendship 
on presence: a man loves his beloved friend more ‘feruentli’ when the friend is ‘present personali 
[i.e. bodily]’, ‘besidis him’, than he does if the friend is ‘absent alwey’. The second supposition is 
that: if a man’s friend is absent then in order to ‘encrese his gode affecciouns’ towards the friend, 
the next best thing to bodily presence is imagining him to be present: ‘so it is, that thilk present 
                                                          
27 Ibid, p. 207. 
28 Ibid, pp. 255-67. On Pecock’s detailed arguments on rhetoric see further Gayk, Image, Text, and 
Religious Reform, e.g. pp. 175-80. 
29 Repressor, p. 267. A number of scholars have discussed this passage. Aston, Lollards and 
Reformers, offers a summary of Pecock’s claims, pp. 185-86, helpfully noting, n.175, that here 
Pecock expounds ‘the devotional values of imagining, inner visualising…which lay behind the 
theory and practice of medieval religious art’. W. R. Jones, ‘Lollards and Images: The Defense of 
Religious Art in Later Medieval England’, Journal of the History of Ideas 34.1 (1973), 27-50, notes 
Pecock’s use of the trope of the absent friend, but does not elaborate upon it (p. 41, n. 73). See 
also Alastair Minnis, ‘Affection and Imagination in “The Cloud of Unknowing” and Hilton’s 
“Scale of Perfection”’, Traditio 39 (1983), 323-366 (p. 362). 
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beyng of the freend, grettist aftir his bodili visible presence, is his presence in ymaginacioun’.30 
The third supposition is that:  
It is esier forto ymagyne a thing absent to be present in an other thing lijk therto, than 
withoute eny other thing lijk therto. Forwhi euery thing lijk to an other thing bringith 
into ymaginacioun and into mynde better and liзter and esier the thing to him lijk, than 
the thing to him lasse lijk or vnlijk.31  
A physical image aids the difficult process of making present something that is absent in the 
imagination; the more like this image is to the thing it signifies, the easier and more precise is this 
imaginative work. The first and second of these rules thus posit the paradigm of friendship as 
central to Pecock’s defence of performative, liturgical practices involving images; the second and 
third of these rules situate that defence further in imaginative and sensory theory. Yet these rules, 
at first, might seem a misdirection: they do not directly address the Lollard objections (to bowing 
to or kissing an image) that they are employed to answer. What the paradigm of friendship 
crucially provides, however, is the evidence, first, that bodily presence, perceptible to the senses, 
is the condition for generating love (as the second supposition clarifies: ‘If the freend were bodili 
visibili present, thilk presence were best forto gendre the seid affeccioun’);32 further, that the 
imagination serves as a virtual space for approximating presence, which, in turn, arouses love; 
and, finally, that imaginative practices, supported by sense perception of an image, do not 
generate love for the image but for the person of whom the image is a likeness. This paradigm 
thus further puts centre stage in the discussion of image use what is also at the heart of the 
commandment of caritas – love – but it does so in a way that makes it inextricable from the logic 
implicit in the notion of presence.  
                                                          
30 Repressor, p 268. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, p. 268. 
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Pecock’s thinking here is thoroughly Thomist. In the Summa, Thomas writes that: love 
‘derives its species from its object, but its intensity from the lover…when the question is one of 
intensity, we must look to the man who loves. By this test a man loves those closest to him’.33 
Species (from the Greek denoting ‘what a thing looks like’) are, as Robert Pasnau explains, 
‘likenesses of the things they represent’. There are three kinds of species: in the air (species in 
medio); in the sense organs (sensible species); and in the intellect (intelligible species).34 Species are thus 
generated by the object but received in the perceiver in the act of perception. Just as a person is 
able to see a stone due to the presence of ‘the species of the stone in his eye’, so a person is able 
to love another through perceiving and cognizing their species.35 It is this, as Thomas goes on to 
explain, that effects a kind of mutual indwelling or union of the lover and the beloved 
(‘Cognitively, the person loved, Y, is said to dwell in the lover, X, in the sense that he is 
consistently present in X’s thoughts’). 36 Love, then, cannot arise without presence and 
perception, but its intensity derives instead from the person who loves (just as clear vision of a 
stone depends, not on the stone’s species, but in ‘the eye’s visual power’). This, then, accounts 
for the importance of proximity in the determining the strength of love felt for another. In the 
Repressor, Pecock takes this Thomist logic further: the nearer one is to the friend the more love is 
aroused; the closest one can be to another is to be touching.   
Engaged as the Repressor is with the precise terms of Lollard arguments, the kinds of 
images Pecock requires his reader to view through the lens of friendship are, of course, 
predominantly (though not exclusively) three-dimensional ones. As Margaret Aston notes:  
                                                          
33 Summa theologiae, 2a2æ.26, 7 (Gilby, XXXIV, 138-9). 
34 Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p. 13. Pp. 11-17 provides an excellent introduction to cognition and the role of 
species in Thomist thought. 
35 The useful comparison with Aquinas’s explanation of how species operate in sight (1a.89, 6) is 
noted by the translator (Gilby,  XXXIV, 138). 
36 Summa theologiae, 1a2æ.28, 2 (Gilby, XIX, 92-3). 
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The imagery seen as proscribed by the law was primarily three dimensional: the works of 
carvers in wood and stone…Lollards were certainly critical of the work of contemporary 
painters, but in directing the main burden of their criticism at image-worship they had in 
mind sculpture – “the craft of graving” – more than painting. 37 
While this concern partly stems from Old Testament prohibitions concerning graven images, it 
also lies in the three-dimensional image’s different claim to realness in comparison with a flat, 
two-dimensional one.38 If for Lollards this sculptural quality, in approximating greater 
lifelikeness, might lead the viewer down the dangerous path of crediting the image with 
liveliness, for Pecock (though he acknowledges that images may indeed at times miraculously 
seem alive) an image’s lifelikeness works less to animate the image than the imagination by 
providing tools for sensory perception.39 Such sculptural images, niched in the fabric of churches 
and used in liturgical performances, offer visible presence to the sense of sight, but they also can 
be reached out to and touched. The paradigm established by these three rules thus has staggering 
implications for Pecock’s theory of images: not merely ‘rememoratijf or mynding signes’, images 
are mediators of the perception of presence at the heart of friendship; and just as the desire to be 
in the presence of a friend is completed in an embrace or a kiss, so too is the imaginative work of 
making an absent friend present completed in touching an image. In revising the function of 
                                                          
37 Aston, Lollards and Reformers, p. 146. 
38 The prohibition against graven images is given, for example, in the second commandment of 
the Decalogue recorded in Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5. On Lollard objections to images, see 
further Richard Marks, Image and Devotion in Late Medieval England (Stroud: Sutton, 2004), p. 2. On 
the medieval association of three-dimensional images with ‘reality’, see Michael Camille, The 
Gothic Idol: Ideology and Image-Making in Medieval Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), p. 41. 
39 The miraculous animation and agency of some images is touched on by Pecock; see Repressor, 
pp. 153-4; 157. For thinking around vivacity or aliveness and images, see further Sarah Stanbury, 
The Visual Object of Desire in Late Medieval England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2008), e.g. pp. 26-7; and ‘The Vivacity of Images: St Katherine, Knighton’s Lollards, and the 
Breaking of Idols’, Images, Idolatry, and Iconoclasm in Late Medieval England: Textuality and the Visual 
Image, ed. Jeremy Dimmick, James Simpson and Nicolette Zeeman (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), pp. 131-50. On the links between sculpture and imagination, see further Camille, 
Gothic Idol, p. 45, where he recounts Hugh of St Victor’s discussion of sculpture compared with 
painting in the Didascalion. 
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images thus, Pecock simultaneously exposes the problem of absence, which images are used to 
counteract, to be all about caritas.  
 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics  
The Middle Ages inherits several classical theories of friendship – principally via Cicero’s De 
amicitia and Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea – and develops, in part under the influence of 
Augustine, Christian ideas of spiritual friendship (as in the writings of Aelred of Rievaulx and 
Bernard of Clairvaux) as well as of friendship with God (as in the work of Robert Grosseteste 
and Thomas Aquinas).40 It seems, however, that it is Aristotle’s theory of friendship, with its 
emphasis on presence and proximity, that motivates Pecock’s recourse to the figure of the absent 
friend in his defence of image use in the Repressor.41 The Nicomachean Ethics, translated into Latin 
by Robert Grosseteste around 1240, details Aristotle’s philosophy of friendship in Books VIII 
and IX.42 While Pecock does not explicitly cite Aristotle in his discussion of the figure of the 
absent friend, his familiarity with the Ethics is evidenced by his citation of both Grosseteste’s 
translation of the Ethics and Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on it elsewhere in the Repressor.43 
                                                          
40 James McEvoy, ‘Ultimate Goods: Happiness, Friendship, and Bliss’, The Cambridge Companion to 
Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. S. McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 254-
75, outlines friendship in Augustine. For Aelred of Rievaulx, see Lefler, Theologizing Friendship; 
and for Bernard of Clairvaux, see Shawn Madison Krahmer, ‘The Friend as “Second Self” and 
the Theme of Substitution in the Letters of Bernard of Clairvaux’, Cistercian Studies Quarterly, 31.1 
(1996), 21-33. On the influence of Aristotelian friendship on Grosseteste’s theology of salvation, 
see James McEvoy, ‘Robert Grosseteste on the Cross and Redemptive Love’, Recherches de théologie 
et philosophie médiévales, 66.2 (1999), 289-315 (e.g. 297-8). 
41 Cicero’s model of friendship does not, as Aristotle’s does, require personal acquaintance. See 
Julian Haseldine, ‘Understanding the Language of amicitia: The Friendship Circle of Peter of 
Celle (c.1115-1183)’, Journal of Medieval History 20 (1994), 237-60 (240).  
42 Grosseteste also writes a commentary on the Ethics. See James McEvoy, ‘Grosseteste’s 
Reflections on Aristotelian Friendship: A “New” Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VIII.8-14’, 
Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship, ed. James McEvoy (Brepols: 
Turnhout, 1994), pp. 149-68. 
43 On the influence of Aristotle on Pecock’s works, see further V. H. H. Green, Bishop Reginald 
Pecock: A Study in Ecclesiastical History and Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), 
pp. 84-7. Hitchcock, ed., Folewer, notes some ‘points of likeness’ between Pecock and Aristotle in 
her commentary, and gives Jessie Flemming’s assessment of the closer relationship of Pecock to 
Thomas Aquinas than to Aristotle, p. 230.  
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And, as already noted, Aristotelian friendship finds profound expression in the thinking of 
Thomas, who is an important authority for Pecock.44 While the Ethics has little to say on the 
subject of images, it provides particularly powerful avenues for thinking about the binaries of 
presence and absence in terms of the interplay of sensory perception and affection.  
Aristotle establishes that friendship is not only ‘necessary’ (‘without friends no one would 
choose to live’) but also ‘noble’.45 While the paradigm of friendship structures relationships from 
the domestic (parent-child; man-wife) to the political (ruler-subject; nation-nation), perfect 
friendship is that between equals. Aristotle defines perfect friendship as: ‘the friendship of men 
who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are 
good in themselves.’46 The conditions for perfect friendship are therefore grounded in virtue, 
equality and likeness – the friend is ‘another self’ – as well as in reciprocity of feeling and mutual 
well-wishing, to the extent that one friend is prepared to sacrifice himself for the other (‘the 
good man…does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for 
them’).47 For such a friendship between equals to arise, however, both time and familiarity are 
required: ‘one must…acquire some experience of the other person and become familiar with 
him, and that is very hard.’ 48 Thus perfect friends, in Aristotle’s estimation, live together; such 
proximity is what makes love for the friend possible. We might thus summarise the central tenets 
of Aristotelian friendship, as the late fifteenth-century Catholicon Anglicum does Middle English 
‘Frende’, in four Latin glosses: ‘amicus [loved one], necessarius, proximus [nearest, next], alter 
ego’.49 Most significant for Pecock’s thinking about images is that the ‘amicus’ must be 
‘proximus’.  
                                                          
44 See n.12 above. 
45 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea (Nicomachean Ethics), trans. W. D. Ross, The Basic Works of Aristotle, 
ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 1058-9, 1155a.1.  
46 Ibid, p. 1061, 1156b.3. 
47 Ibid, p. 1087, 11169a.8. 
48 Ibid, p. 1064, 1158a.6. 
49 Catholicon Anglicum: An English-Latin Wordbook, ed. S. J. H. Herrtage and H. B. Wheatley, EETS 
75 (1881; reprint 1987), p. 142. 
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As Aristotle makes clear, proximity and presence themselves, of course, are all to do with 
sensory perception. Embedded in the Ethics’ discussion of friendship is, accordingly, another of 
perception, where Aristotle is at pains to posit not just perception but the recognition of perception 
(‘he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears’, etc.) as lying at the core of 
self-consciousness and ultimately of happiness: a man ‘needs, therefore, to be conscious of the 
existence of his friend…and this will be realized in their living together’.50 The perception of the 
presence of the friend is thus necessary, not only in order for friendly feelings to arise but also 
for those feelings to be sustained:  
Those who live together delight in each other and confer benefits on each other, but 
those who are asleep or locally separated are not performing, but are disposed to 
perform, the activities of friendship; distance does not break off the friendship 
absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to 
make men forget their friendship; hence the saying ‘out of sight, out of mind’.51  
Somewhat problematically for the medieval reception of the Ethics, however, the human 
possibility that friendship might survive (temporary) absence or distance is not one Aristotle 
affords to God, nor does he allow perfect friendship to exist between God and man on the 
grounds of inequality:  
Much can be taken away and friendship remain, but when one party is removed to a 
great distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases.52  
As Jacques Derrida observes on this passage in The Politics of Friendship:  
Presence or proximity [proximité] are the condition of friendship, whose energy [énergie] 
is lost in absence or in remoteness. Men are called ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’ from the vantage 
                                                          
50 Nicomachean Ethics, p. 1090, 1170a.9. On medieval reception of Aristotle’s ideas about 
happiness and their dependency on sensory perception, see Jessica Rosenfeld, Ethics and 
Enjoyment in Late Medieval Poetry: Love after Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), pp. 135-49. 
51 Nicomachean Ethics, p. 1063, 1157b.5. 
52 Ibid, p. 1066, 1159a.7. 
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point of aptitude, possibility, habitus (kath'éxin) or in act (kat'enérgeian). It is the same for 
friendship: friends who sleep or live in separate places are not friends in act (ouk 
energousi). The energy of friendship draws its force from presence or from proximity. If absence and 
remoteness do not destroy friendship, they attenuate or exhaust it, they enervate it.53  
Derrida’s reading of the Ethics usefully articulates the condition of presence for the ‘energy’ – 
activity, but also force or potency – constitutive of Aristotelian friendship. If friendship is 
generated and nurtured through living together and through sensory perception, how can man 
(in the here and now) be friends with God? While medieval thinking asserts instead that 
friendship with God is necessary and possible, Aristotelian friendship, in making proximity or 
presence the condition of friendship, poses the question of how love for God is to be 
maintained and acted out at a distance and in His absence.54 Christ’s incarnation is key to 
medieval answers to this problem, but so too, as the Repressor demonstrates, are images.  
 
Images and absence  
While Aristotelian qualities of perfect friendship – the friend is ‘another self’, prepared to 
sacrifice his life for his friends – might be particularly suggestive for analogy with Christ, as they 
are elsewhere in scholastic and vernacular theology, Thomas Aquinas’s theology of friendship, as 
Nathan Lefler summarises, is ‘transcendent’: that is, it is more interested in friendship with God 
‘in his essence’ than with the person of Christ.55 It is Aristotle’s condition of equality for 
friendship in the Ethics, however, that motivates, in Lefler’s words, Thomas’s ‘brief, lapidary 
                                                          
53 Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997), p. 222. 
54 See further, Caroline White, ‘Friendship in Absence—Some Patristic Views’, Friendship in 
Medieval Europe, ed. Julian Haseldine (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999), pp. 68-88, for Patristic 
engagement with the idea of absence.  
55 Theologizing Friendship, pp. 117-20. For example, Robert Grosseteste takes up the notion of the 
friend as the ‘alter ipse’ (the other self) in developing his theology of salvation. John Lydgate’s 
poem, ‘A Freond at Neode’, shows Christ’s death for mankind provides the superlative example 
of friendship; and the fifteenth-century Mirour of Mans Saluacioun describes Christ’s loss of blood 
in the Crucifixion itself as a ‘friendly’ act. 
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formulation of the theology of friendship in brazenly Christological terms’.56 In Book IV, 
chapter 54 of the Summa contra gentiles, Thomas posits that friendship between man and God in 
his essence is made possible through Christ’s Incarnation:  
since friendship consists in a certain equality, things greatly unequal seem unable to be 
coupled in friendship. Therefore, to get greater familiarity in friendship between man and 
God it was helpful for man that God become man, since even by nature man is man’s 
friend; and so in this way, ‘while we know God visibly, we may [through Him] be borne 
to love of things invisible’. 57  
Incarnation, then, effects a kind of equality, a ‘familiarity’, between God and man necessary in 
Aristotelian terms for perfect friendship. Inextricably in Thomas’s thinking here, however, the 
equality effected by the Incarnation also entails presence – not only bringing God down to earth, 
but making Him perceptible to human, bodily senses: knowledge of God in His visible, human 
form leads us to love of God in His essence. While Thomas is thinking about the Incarnation 
and not about images at this point in the Summa contra gentiles, it is precisely this catenation that 
grounds the orthodox claim, commonly made in the medieval period, that making images of 
God is lawful: the same move in which Incarnation makes friendship between God and man 
possible also makes God visible and representable.58  
                                                          
56 Theologizing Friendship, p. 119. 
57 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, gen. ed. Jospeh Kenny, O.P. (New York: Hanover 
House, 1955-7), Book IV ‘Salvation’, trans. Charles O’Neil. See Marko Fuchs, ‘Philia and Caritas: 
Some Aspects of Aquinas’s Reception of Aristotle’s Theory of Friendship’, Aquinas and the 
Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller and Matthias Perkams (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 203-19. 
58 Influentially elaborating a connection made by earlier writers, John of Damascus cites the 
Incarnation as authorising the making and use of images in his eighth-century defence of icons, 
On the Divine Images: Three Apologies Against Those Who Attack the Divine Images, trans. David 
Anderson (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary, 1980), e.g. pp. 23-6. Fourteenth- and 
fifteenth-century discussions of images commonly continue to cite this argument: on its longer 
history, see further, Alain Besançon, The Forbidden Image: An Intellectual History of Iconoclasm 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 115-23; and Stanbury, The Visual Object, e.g. p. 
21, specifically for English examples in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
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According to orthodox defences of images, then, Christ’s Incarnation authorises bodily 
representations of the divine. But if the Incarnation is fundamentally about making God present 
and perceptible to man, because of Christ’s Resurrection and Ascension the fullness of this 
presence is deferred until a future moment: Christ is, for the time being, bodily absent.59 Thus 
one function of images, as Roger Dymmok suggests in his Latin, anti-Lollard treatise Liber contra 
errores et hereses lolladorum (c.1396), is to offer a material remnant of, or a substitute for, bodily 
presence:  
when a man has loved something fervently, he desires its presence; and therefore, since 
we rightly owe the saints of God to be worshipped and venerated by means of the 
honours that are due to them, because we cannot have the persons themselves present, 
we are advised at least to come near to their relics and images in order to worship them.60  
Images and relics, in the form of body parts or objects that have been touched by or worn on the 
body, offer material points of connection with an absent God and absent saints, love for whom 
manifests itself as a desire for presence, for nearness to them. At heart, then, image-making 
addresses the human need for something of the divine to be made available to the senses. As 
David Freedberg remarks, the aim of ‘[medieval meditative] forms that depend on real images 
for the production of mental ones’ is precisely ‘to grasp that which is absent’.61 What Dymmok 
imagines as presence, however – being near to a material relic or image – though not without 
active potential (as a locus for worship, but also for healing, for spiritual transformation, etc.), is 
a far cry from that defined by Aristotle and implied by Pecock, as the energy of living together. 
                                                          
59 On Christ’s ‘imminent disappearance’, see Amy Knight Powell, Depositions: Scenes from the Late 
Medieval Church and the Modern Museum (New York: Zone, 2012).  
60 Rogeri Dymmok, Liber Contra Errores et Hereses Lolladorum, ed. H. S. Cronin (London: Published 
for the Wyclif Society by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co, 1922), 193: ‘cum homo aliquid 
feruenter amauerit, eius presenciam desiderat; et ideo, cum sanctis Dei merito affici debeamus et 
eos debitis honoribus uenerari, quia personas ipsas in presenti habere non possumus, saltem ad 
eorum reliquias uel ymagines adorandus accedere monemur’ (Modern English translation my 
own). 
61 David Freedberg, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 161. 
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As the Repressor demonstrates, it is the mnemonic function of images that becomes key for 
enabling a different kind of presence – one that is an active, lived out performance. 
Since, as Aristotle suggests, long absence might not only enervate love but lead to 
forgetting, images are also justified to remind Christians of those they ought to love and serve – 
in other words, as goads to the activity of remembrance. In his fifth principal conclusion on 
image use in Part 2 of the Repressor, Pecock thus points out that, in ordaining the Sacrament of 
the Altar in which bread and wine are made flesh and blood, Christ Himself instituted Christian 
use of signs and symbols for precisely the purpose of remembrance: ‘Crist ordeyned in the newe 
lawe visible sacramentis to be take and vsid as seable rememoratijf signes of Crist, and of his 
passioun and deeth, and of his holi lijf’.62 Since Christ ordained the use of ‘seable’ signs in the 
form of bread and wine, Pecock concludes, then images that are likenesses of Him must also be 
permissible. The grounds for this claim lie in medieval sign theory.63 If it is lawful and expedient 
to use a sign that is not like the thing it signifies, it must also be to use one that is like, or more 
like, that which it signifies:  
Forwhi the likenes of a signe to his significat, (that is to seie, to the thing signified bi 
him,) wole helpe the signe forto signifie and forto make remembraunce the bettir upon 
the thing signified; but so it is, that ymagis graued, coruun, or зut ben more lijk to Crist 
and to his passioun, than ben the sacramentis whiche Crist ordeyned.64  
                                                          
62 Repressor, p. 163. 
63 St Augustine influentially lays out the thinking that forms the foundation of medieval sign 
theory, for example, in De doctrina Christiana. For the development of sign theory in the high 
medieval period, and especially its implication with questions of absence and presence, see 
Brigitte Miriam Bedos-Rezak, ‘Medieval Identity, A Sign, A Concept’, American Historical Review 
105.5 (2000), 1489-1533; for the later medieval period, see further Arthur Ross, Medieval Sign 
Theory and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). 
64 Repressor, p. 163. Cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr (New York: 
The Liberal Arts Press, 1958): ‘It is true that everyone seeks a certain verisimilitude in making 
signs so that these signs, in so far as is possible, may resemble the things that they 
signify…Where pictures of statues are concerned, or other similar imitative works…no one errs 
when he sees the likeness, so that he recognizes what things are represented’, p. 61. On the role 
of likeness, see further Heather Madar, ‘Iconography of Sign: A Semiotic Reading of the Arma 
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Images of Christ that are graven, carven or cast (‘ymagis graued, coruun, or зut’), Pecock 
somewhat audaciously claims, are therefore more efficacious signs of Him than the sacraments, 
their particular present-making power notwithstanding. Here, Pecock seeds the principle of 
likeness that he returns to in his claim that an ‘ymage of Crist crucified’ can best mediate 
friendship with an absent Christ: likeness helps the sign signify and better enables remembrance. 
This principle is so crucial because of how human memory operates.  
Medieval memory work, as Mary Carruthers’ demonstrates, is not a neutral, merely 
intellective process of recollection, but a fully embodied, affective one that is all about ‘making 
present’.65 Staged in the imagination and reliant on prior sensory perception, it is this imaginative 
making present that enables the virtual performance of friendship with God that must, in 
Pecock’s thinking, accord with a Christian’s external actions. Pecock’s broadly Aristotelian 
understanding of the nexus of sense perception, imagination and memory is central to his image 
theory and, in fact, is foundational to his whole literary project. The Donet, the Folewer and the 
Reule, for example, each predicate vernacular instruction in theology on a prior knowledge of 
what man is and on an understanding of the interrelation of body and soul. Pecock thus sets out 
at the start of each of these works the operation of the five outer wits (sight, hearing, smell, taste 
and touch) and their cerebral processing by the five inner wits (common wit, imagination, 
fantasy, estimation and memory).66 The Donet explains that the office of the senses is ‘forto 
knowe bodili þingis in her presence, and whilis þei ben in kynde’; the inward wits, instead, work 
to know such things when they are absent.67 As Pecock’s multiple accounts all reiterate, the 
imagination plays a key role in the cognitive capacity to make something that is absent to the 
                                                          
Christi’, ReVisioning: Critical Methods of Seeing Christianity in the History of Art, ed. James Romaine 
and Linda Stratford (Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 2014), pp. 115-31 (e.g. pp. 124-5). 
65 Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), see, e.g. p. 275. Carruthers notes the derivation of the Latin 
verb representare from praesens, meaning ‘presence in time’. 
66 See, for example, Donet, pp. 8-11; Folewer, pp. 20-30; and Reule, p. 37, etc. 
67 Donet, p. 9. 
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senses present in the mind, and further, in Pecock’s account, in storing (along with memory) ‘alle 
þe same now seid knowingis wiþ her fundamentis [foundations, bases], whiche ben called 
“similitudis”, “liknessis”, or “ymagis” of þingis, þat þei falle not soon aweie’.68  
Precisely what these ‘similitudis’, ‘likenessis’ or ‘ymagis’ are is made clearer in the Folewer, 
which builds on the foundation of sensory knowledge given in the Donet by detailing more fully 
the optical theory of intromission.69 This theory is an extension of medieval thinking around the 
notion of species, at the heart (as we have seen) of Thomist understandings of cognition. The 
‘likeness’ (also referred to in optical theory as ‘species’) of an object is impressed into the eyeball, 
from whence the ‘spiritis’ – a bodily spirit that performs the offices of soul – carries it into the 
sinews (or nerves): the eye thus ‘seeþ and knowiþ þe þing whos liknesse is so receyuyd into þe 
iзe’.70 That likeness is then conveyed further ‘bi office of spiritis’ into the forehead, where it is 
impressed first lightly in the common wit and then more deeply in the imagination, by which 
likeness the inner wits ‘knowe þe same þing’ as the eye perceived. The way in which a likeness of 
an object sensed is brought into the body by means of spiritis and impressed in the imagination 
supports the logic of Pecock’s claim that the more like an image is to the thing it signifies the 
easier it is to do cognitive work with it; it also discloses a material aspect to imaginative ‘making 
present’. Likenesses – whether first brought into the mind through the eye or through any other 
organ of sense – are called up from the store in memory to stock the images required in the 
process of imagining.71 Doing this without the aid of any physical image is hard work, as Pecock 
                                                          
68 Ibid, p. 10, my emphasis. 
69 See Mishtooni Bose, ‘Vernacular Philosophy and the Making of Orthodoxy in the Fifteenth 
Century’, New Medieval Literatures 7 (2005), 73-99, for Pecock’s knowledge of optical theory, 88-
93. David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision From Al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1976), offers a detailed history of medieval optical theory and the theory of intromission, 
in particular. Chapter 7 details its place, not only in science and philosophy, but also in theology. 
70 Folewer, p. 39. See Michael Camille, ‘Before the Gaze: The Internal Senses and Late Medieval 
Practices of Seeing’, Visuality Before and Beyond the Renaissance: Seeing as Others Saw, ed. Robert 
Nelson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 197-223, on the intromission model 
of vision, the importance of the principle of likeness and the role of the ‘species’ in bridging ‘the 
physical gap between the object and the sense organ’ (p. 208). 
71 Cf. Folewer, pp. 39-40 on the operation of the other senses in comparison with sight. 
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points out in the Repressor. If a man seeks to recall what he has heard preached or read in church 
previously, for example,  
it schal be to him miche gretter labour for to laboure so in his brayn bi taking mynde and 
for to withinneforth calle into mynde without siзt of the iзe withouteforth vpon ymagis 
what he bifore knewe and thouзte vpon, than it schulde be to him if he biholde bi iзe 
siзt upon ymagis or other peinting according to his labour. And aзenward, bi biholding 
upon ymagis or upon such peinting his witt schal be dressid and lad forthe euener and 
more stabili and with myche lasse peyne and labour, than forto wrastle withinneforth in 
his owne ymaginaciouns withoute leding withouteforth had bi biholding upon ymagis.72  
The cerebral struggle involved in calling into mind ‘withinneforth’, without an external image 
‘withouteforth’ looked upon by the eye, is amply reflected in Pecock’s convoluted syntax. But the 
essential point is a simple one: images, especially those that are like that which they signify, make 
the devotional work of memory easier and less painful, but also less error-prone – a man’s wit 
shall be ‘dressid [guided, directed] and lad forthe euener and more stabili’ – by making present to 
the sense of sight an image upon which inner sight can found its images in the imagination.  
What motivates Pecock’s thinking here, and throughout his discussion of the senses, 
imagination and memory, is a recognition of man’s natural frailty. It is because ‘mankinde in this 
lijf is so freel’ that ‘seable’ signs are needed in addition to ‘heareable’ ones: man’s ability to recall 
and remember rightly is affected by labour, study, old age and sickness (when ‘his heed is feeble 
for labour or studie bifore had or for sikenes or for age’); and humans are prone to 
forgetfulness.73 The sixth opening conclusion on pilgrimages offered by Pecock in Part 2 of the 
Repressor makes clear just what is at stake in man’s tendency to forget: if Christ’s life and Passion 
are not remembered, ‘thei schulen not be reckid [regarded]’, and ‘sithen al thing which is not had 
in mynde of a man is, as toward eny thing which he schulde do ther with or ther bi, deed or lost 
                                                          
72 Repressor, p. 214. 
73 Ibid, p. 209; p. 213; e.g. p. 165. 
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or not being’.74 Not remembering Christ might mean it is as if He is dead, lost or even as not 
having existed at all.  
The parallel sixth conclusion on images identifies this problem of forgetfulness more 
specifically as the central issue for caritas. Here Pecock reminds the reader of what he has set out 
in the Repressor’s opening: that each man (and woman) is commanded to ‘loue God and drede 
God, that he mai therbi be hertid and strengthid in wil forto serue God’; he therefore needs to 
‘ofte thinke vpon tho thingis and meenis, whiche schulden stire him forto loue God and drede 
God’. And yet: ‘forto so ofte remembre we ben ful freel and forзeteful’.75 The memory work 
central to obeying the biblical commandment to love God, neighbour and self is potentially 
compromised by man’s natural frailty. As Thomas acknowledges in his discussion of charity in 
the Summa, although God is of Himself ‘supremely knowable, …on account of the feebleness of 
our knowledge, which has to depend on things of sense, we do not find him so’.76 For Pecock, as 
we have seen, images are part of the solution to man’s dependency on sense perception. 
Significantly, then, it is in the context of this reminder of the command to ‘loue and 
drede God’, that Pecock first invokes the figure of the absent friend (though he does not use the 
term ‘friend’, the analogy is implicitly one of friendship). Referring to the authority of reason 
(‘doom of resoun allowith’), Pecock argues it is permissible:  
forto make and haue for us silf and for othere men ymagis of men and wommen, that 
tho men and wommen be therbi the oftir thouзt upon, and therfore be therbi the more 
loued and the better serued, and that the more be doon and suffrid of us and of othere 
biholders, for as miche as we bithenken tho persoones or the ensaumpling of the 
persoones so representid bi the ymagis, and that the more be doon and suffrid for her 
sake of us silf and of othere men seing the same ymagis with vs.77 
                                                          
74 Ibid, p. 182. 
75 Ibid, p. 165. 
76 Summa theologiae, 2a2æ.24, 2 (Gilby, XXXIV, 38-9). 
77 Repressor, pp. 164-5. 
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Just as an image of an absent friend enables another to think about (or imagine) them often and 
thus better love and serve them, so too, Pecock claims, does an image of God or a saint. The 
Latin treatise (written between 1385 and 1395) known variously as De tolerandis imaginibus or De 
adoracione Ymaginum, attributed to Walter Hilton, similarly argues that images are permissible 
‘because sometimes a friend, who absences himself from his friend, is in the habit of giving him 
an image as a memento, so that he can remember the absent friend by looking at the image’.78 
Pecock’s accumulative thinking around friendship and images in the Repressor, however, goes 
much further than does Hilton’s brief recourse to it in De tolerandis imaginibus.79 In Pecock’s 
second, extended use of the figure of friendship fifteen chapters later, Christ becomes the absent 
friend we are recalling, friendship with whom is the central requirement of the greatest biblical 
commandment. And just as an image as a memento facilitates the imaginative making present of 
an absent friend necessary to perform and sustain the activity of friendship (love, service and 
even sacrifice), so too does an image of Christ enable the memory work central to meeting the 
demands of caritas.  
 
 
Christ the absent friend  
Like Thomas Aquinas’s, Pecock’s theology of friendship is concerned principally with friendship 
with God in his essence. The turn to Christ as friend in the Repressor, is (like Thomas’s in the 
Summa contra gentiles) exceptional and all the more compelling as a result. Pecock arrives at the 
                                                          
78 Walter Hilton’s Latin Writings, ed. John P. H. Clark and Cheryl Taylor, 2 vols, Analecta 
Carutisana, 124 (Salzburg: Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik, 1987), p. 199: ‘Quia interdum 
amicus se absentans ab amico, aliquod signum recordatiuum ad amicum suum transmitter solet, 
ut per intuitum signi recordetur asbentis amici’. Modern English translation my own. For a 
detailed summary of this treatise, see J. P. H. Clark, ‘Walter Hilton in Defence of the Religious 
Life and of the Veneration of Images’, The Downside Review 103 (1985), 1-25. See further, Alastair 
Minnis, ‘Affection and Imagination in “The Cloud of Unknowing” and Hilton’s “Scale of 
Perfection”’, Traditio 39 (1983), 323-366 (361).  
79 See further Marks, Image and Devotion, for ways Pecock goes beyond other defences of the 
image, e.g. p. 18. 
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idea of Christ the friend, as I have sought to explicate in this essay, as the culmination of his 
thinking around caritas as friendship predicated on presence, and around the role of the 
imagination, memory and the senses in making present something that is absent. From this 
perspective, Pecock’s thinking about images in terms of the presence necessary for friendship in 
the Repressor is entirely consonant with a broadly Aristotelian understanding of the role of the 
senses and imagination in making present what is absent. Having set out the paradigm for 
friendship in the form of three rules at the opening of chapter 20 of Part 2 of the Repressor 
Pecock proceeds thus (as already outlined above):  
Ech man hath nede forto haue gode affecciouns anentis Crist, as upon his best freend; 
and this freend зeueth not to us his presence visibili; wherfore it is profitable to ech man 
for to ymagine this freend be present to us bodili and in a maner visibili. And sithen 
herto serueth ful weel and ful myche the ymage of Crist crucified, whilis and if the 
biholder ymagineth Crist to be streiзt abrode bodili thoruз the bodi of the same ymage, 
heed to heed, hond to hond, breste to breste, foot to foot.80  
In our second look at this passage, we should first note the invocation of the commandment of 
caritas (‘ech man hath nede forto haue gode affecciouns anentis Crist’), its expression as 
friendship (‘as upon his best freend’) and the way it steers Pecock’s argument: images are 
imbricated profoundly in fulfilling the fundamental requirements of Christian living. Christ the 
friend is not visibly present, and yet as the first rule has established and as Aristotle emphasises, 
presence is the condition for the arousal of love and its increase. This, as Thomas emphasises in 
his account of charity in the Summa, is rooted in ‘dwelling together’, which concept (as the 
translator notes) ‘is given its full and active force…Convivere, conversatio, communicatio, participatio are 
key-words for association which is the basis of friendship’.81  The condition of cohabitation for 
friendship is likewise drawn out by Pecock in the proofs he gives of the first rule:  
                                                          
80 Repressor, p. 269. 
81 Summa theologiae, note to 2a2æ.23, 1 (Gilby, XXXIV, 5). 
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This reule is openli trewe bi experience. Forwhi, (not withstonding a man talke and speke 
of his freend at the mete table or in sum other place, and haue as good affeccioun as he 
can haue upon the same freend in such absence,) зit if in the meene while the freend 
come into him personali and sitte doun with him, he schal haue miche gretter affeccioun 
vpon the seid freend than he hadde in the freendis absence.82  
The ‘mete [dinner] table’ becomes a kind of paradigmatic space for practising friendship: for 
sitting and talking together in person, or, in the friend’s absence, for sitting and talking about the 
friend. The problem is thus implicitly raised: how is Christ to be loved above all others, if those 
others are present and He is absent?83 Imagining Christ to be ‘present to us bodili’ goes some 
way to countering this problem, not least since, as the second rule has established, making 
something present in the imagination, though inferior to bodily presence, is nonetheless a real 
form of presence with a material felt aspect that enables love. This imaginative memory work is 
aided best by using an image of Christ crucified, because, as established by the third rule, it bears 
a direct likeness with that which it represents.  
It is this insistence on the importance of the sign’s likeness to what it signifies that leads 
Pecock to reject, earlier in the Repressor, the Lollard argument ‘“that ech Cristen man is a perfiter 
and a fuller and a spedier [that is, ‘efficacious’, but also ‘exact’] ymage of Crist than is eny stok 
[piece of wood] or stoon graued”’.84 In so doing, Pecock closes down the possibility (at the heart 
of Lollard arguments against images) that the energy required for friendship with Christ might 
derive from proximity to one’s neighbour. Listing three conditions required in order to be a 
perfect, full and efficacious image of Christ, Pecock reiterates firstly that the greater degree of 
                                                          
82 Repressor, p. 267. 
83 Thomas in the Summa theologiae asserts that since charity is caused by God it cannot, in this 
sense, cease or be diminished (see 2a2æ.24, 10,), but he acknowledges that man’s reliance on 
sense perception to know God creates a problem (see 2a2æ,27, 4). 
84 Repressor, p. 219. See further on man as a true image of God, Aston, Lollards and Reformers, e.g. 
pp. 155-9. 
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likeness there is, the greater is the claim of one thing to be the perfect image of another.85 The 
second condition is that the image must be ordained to signify something in particular. The third 
is that the image must signify singly (using a sign which signifies multiply will mean its likeness to 
Christ will suffer interference from its likeness to something else). Pecock therefore concludes:  
no Cristen man now lyuyng hath these iij. condicions anentis the persoon of Crist in his 
manhode, as hath a stok or a stoon graued into the likenes of Crist hanging on a cros 
nakid and wounded…except whanne a quyk man is sett in a pley to be hangid nakid on a 
cros and to be in semyng woundid and scourgid. And this bifallith ful seelde and in fewe 
placis and cuntrees.86  
Notably, then, a living man acting out the part of Christ in the Crucifixion, as might be seen in a 
mystery play, trumps images. But since this, at least according to Pecock, happens seldom and in 
only a few places, three-dimensional images that represent Christ crucified are the next best 
thing.87  
The utility of an image’s likeness is further extended in Pecock’s detailing of the precise 
way in which a Christian should use the image in the imagination in relation to the physical 
image: an image is particularly efficacious in making present an absent Christ, ‘whilis and if the 
biholder ymagineth Crist to be streiзt abrode bodili thoruз the bodi of the same ymage, heed to 
heed, hond to hond, breste to breste, foot to foot’. What, though, does Pecock mean by this? 
‘Streiзt abrode’, suggests both the idea of extension (the MED s. v. ‘strecchen’, gives ‘stretched 
                                                          
85 Repressor, pp. 219-20. 
86 Ibid, p. 221. 
87 The question of whether London had comparable biblical play cycles to, e.g., York or 
Coventry remains under discussion. There are records of a biblical drama performed at 
Clerkenwell (just outside of London) between 1384 and 1409. Anne Lancashire, London Civic 
Theatre: City Drama and Pageantry from Roman Times to 1558 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), suggest this was a continuous, regular tradition of playing the biblical cycle. 
Lawrence M. Clopper, ‘London and the Problem of the Clerkenwell Plays’, Comparative Drama, 
34.3 (2000), 291-303, believes instead that these were one-off performances. But in either case, 
the evidence disappears after 1409, so whether such plays were regularly being performed in 
London at the time Pecock is writing remains uncertain. 
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out’ as one possibility for ‘streiзt abrode (forth)’), as well as of straightness or directness. One 
way of understanding the imaginative process Pecock describes, then, is as follows: in looking at 
the image that gives physical sight the Christian needs also to see the real Christ stretched 
through or over this image in the imagination. That the past participle of the verb ‘strecchen’ (as 
the MED attests) might be rendered ‘streiзt’ implies precisely this kind of stretching (so ‘streiзt 
abrode’, in this reading, would mean ‘stretched across’). In this sense, there is some overlap with 
the common use of Middle English ‘strecchen’ to refer to Christ’s body on the cross, of which 
examples in medieval literature are plentiful, or with Christ’s own act of stretching down from 
the cross to embrace the penitent sinner as His friend, as recounted in an exemplum drawn upon 
in Good Friday sermons.88 
Another complementary way of understanding what Pecock is describing, however, is 
according to the more specific terms of the operation of sensory perception. As an adjective 
(derived from the same verb ‘strecchen’), ‘streiзt’ also means ‘straight’ or ‘direct’ and so recalls 
the vernacular vocabulary for describing the optical lines (conveying species) understood to 
stretch from an object to the eye in the theory of intromission (so, in this second reading, ‘streiзt 
abrode’ would mean something like ‘straight through’). Underpinning the cognitive process that 
maps an image of Christ in the imagination to a physical image is thus a sensory one predicated 
(quite literally) on straight lines. The encyclopaedia On the Properties of Things, translated into 
Middle English by John Trevisa around 1398, thus records, following the authority of Aristotle, 
that sight is made ‘by straite lynes vpon þe whiche þe liknes of þe þing þat is iseyne comeþ to þe 
                                                          
88 On this motif, see Margaret Aston, ‘Lollards and the Cross’, Lollards and their Influence in Late 
Medieval England, ed. Fiona Somerset, Jill C. Havens and Derrick G. Pitard (Woodbridge: Boydell, 
2003), pp. 99-113, and Sara Lipton, ‘The Sweet Lean of His Head”: Writing about Looking at the 
Crucifix in the High Middle Ages’, Speculum, 80 (2005), 1172-1208. Cf. Lipton’s discussion of 
Rupert Deutz (1179). Exempla collections tell of how, on Good Friday, Christ leaned down 
from the cross to embrace a penitent sinner; see Gwenfair Walters Adams, Visions in Late 
Medieval England: Lay Spirituality and Sacred Glimpses of the Hidden Worlds of Faith (Leiden: Brill, 
2007), p. 149 for examples. 
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siзt’.89 When a viewer sees an image of the crucified Christ, the lines conveying the image’s 
likeness to sight connect Christ in the imagination with the physical image: head to head, hand to 
hand, breast to breast, foot to foot.  
By describing, and so teaching, a form of imagining predicated on the operation of sight, 
in which a virtual image of Christ is ‘streiзt abrode bodily thoruз the bodi’ of a physical image, 
Pecock is at pains to show the material connection between interior and exterior that orients 
how liturgical performances should be understood: external actions (such as processing with, 
praying and bowing to, or kissing images) should be contiguous with an imaginative process that 
aims to make Christ in some sense really present. Attentiveness to this contiguity between 
interior presence and external acts, achieved through this imaginative practice, is what staves off 
idolatry by properly directing worship and love to God. Such contiguity, not only of the external 
with the interior image, but also of external action with imagined action, in facilitating a kind of 
virtual living together, is thus key to performing the activity of friendship necessary to caritas. 
Indeed, as Pecock observes, such was the ‘oolde practik of deuote Cristen men’. Thus, in Palm 
Sunday processions when the cross was bowed to, devout Christians ‘helden hem silf forto 
meete bodili and presentli with Crist’ in the imagination. Likewise, in creeping to the Cross on 
Good Friday, ‘aftir her ymaginacioun’ they ‘crepiden to the persoon of Crist, which bi her 
ymaginacioun was bodili streiзt forth with the bodi of the ymage’. And in kissing the feet of the 
image on the cross, they did so, ‘not as that the feet of the ymage weren al that thei there 
kissiden, but that ther with thei kessiden the feet of Crist whom thei ymagineden to be there in 
bodili maner present’. 90 In these further iterations of, or steps in, imagining Christ to be ‘bodili 
streiзt forth with the bodi of the ymage’, the lines established between the imagined image and 
the physical one through vision are first paralleled by the physical extension of the viewer’s body 
                                                          
89 M. C. Seymour and others, eds, On the Properties of Things: John Trevisa’s Translation of 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus ‘De Proprietatibus Rerum’, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), I, 109. 
Lines are understood to also be bent or refracted. 
90 Repressor, pp. 269-70. 
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towards the image in the act of bowing and then, finally, replaced with the body itself in the act 
of touching.  
We might think that vision is unique in its reception of species cast out from an object, 
but, as Pecock notes, all the senses are understood to bring likenesses into the body in essentially 
similar ways. On the Properties of Things further suggests that all the inner senses, located in the 
brain, are connected to each of the sense organs, and so in some way to all objects of sense 
through lines: ‘hit is comyn and general to all þe vttir wittis þat fram þe innere wit, þat hatte 
sensus comunis “þe comyn witte”, comeþ as it were lynes out of þe middle þerof to eueruche 
singular vttir wit and makeþ it parfite’.91 Thus, in the act of kissing the feet of an image of Christ 
while imagining kissing the feet of Christ, it is touch itself that establishes the material 
connection (the lines conveying species) between image and imagination, making them 
contiguous. The imagined and the actual are thus traversed through touch, creating presence and 
arousing love. 
 
Touching images 
Pecock asserts that the same imaginative and sensory processes at work in the ‘practik’ of 
Christians in the past should likewise underpin current devotional and liturgical uses of images.92 
In the closing stages of Part 2 of the Repressor, Pecock thus returns the reader to contemporary 
liturgical performances involving images and touch (those which cause Lollards to feel ‘out of 
eese’) with a reformed understanding of their value: the process of making Christ present in the 
imagination in order to love Him wholeheartedly must be matched in external action and is 
completed in touch.  
Liturgical performances such as the Palm Sunday procession and Good Friday creeping 
to the Cross are, of course, collective instances of remembrance that aim at a kind of making 
                                                          
91 On the Properties of Things, I, 119. 
92 On liturgical use of images, see further Marks, Image and Devotion, e.g. pp. 160-1. 
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present even while they might embody (and even, as Amy Knight Powell suggests, prefigure) 
absence.93 In the Palm Sunday procession, re-presenting Christ’s entry into Jerusalem, the 
sacrament – the real presence of Christ in the form of bread and wine – is processed outside and 
then brought into the church. As Eamon Duffy describes:   
The clergy and people entered the church, passing under the shrine with the Sacrament, 
and then the whole procession moved to its culminating point before the Rood-screen. 
All through Lent a great painted veil had been suspended in front of the Crucifix on the 
Rood-screen. This veil was now drawn up on pulleys, the whole parish knelt, and the 
anthem “Ave Rex Noster” was sung, while the clergy venerated the cross by kissing the 
ground.94  
On Good Friday, commemorating Christ’s Passion, a Crucifix is unveiled (this time, in three 
stages), culminating in the custom of creeping to it: as Duffy describes, ‘Clergy and people then 
crept barefoot and on their knees to kiss the foot of the cross’. Afterwards, the consecrated Host 
is symbolically ‘buried’ in the Easter sepulchre.95 Deposition rites associated with Holy Week, as 
Powell describes, sometimes also used an articulated Christ with moving body parts to re-enact 
His burial.96 Scholars have thoroughly documented the ways in which three-dimensional images 
are thus used, along with the material space and fabric of a church, to emphasise visual spectacle 
                                                          
93 On the role of the liturgy in collective remembrance and making present, see further 
Carruthers, The Book of Memory, and The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of 
Images, 400-1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); on the idea of absence in 
medieval Deposition images and their prefiguration of Reformation iconoclasm, see Powell, 
Depositions. On paraliturgical performances, such as plays, and presence, see further Sarah 
Beckwith, ‘Absent Presences: The Theatre of Resurrection in York’, Medieval Literature and 
Historical Inquiry: Essays in Honor of Derek Pearsall, ed. David Aers (Brewer: Cambridge, 2000), pp. 
185-205 (e.g. p. 185). 
94 Eamon Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400-1580 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1992), p. 25. 
95 Ibid, p. 29.  
96 On such moving Christs, see Powell, Depositions; Laura Varnam, ‘The Crucifix, the Pietà, and 
the Female Mystic: Devotional Objects and Performative Identity in The Book of Margery Kempe’, 
Journal of Medieval Religious Cultures, 41.2 (2015), 208-37. 
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in liturgical performance in the medieval period.97 More recent scholarship has begun to 
recognise the ways in which even objects seen in this context also operate in conjunction with 
haptic experience. Jacqueline E. Jung and Joanne E. Ziegler, for example, find (respectively) that 
devotional engagements with rood screens and Pietà sculptures should be understood in a tactile 
frame.98 But material objects situated in churches, more than just appealing to a sense of touch, 
also invite literal acts of touching. As Caroline Walker Bynum highlights, devotional objects were 
often constructed precisely to ‘call attention to their materiality by means both obvious and 
subtle’: some were thus designed in such a way as to ‘impel…viewers to experience greater 
tactility as they penetrated to deeper soteriological truth’; others, however, explicitly ‘enjoined the 
worshipper to kiss them’.99  
The explicit invitation made in the context of the liturgy to touch images is in part so 
objectional to Lollards, as Pecock summarises, because in so doing people ‘beren hem silf and 
gourene hem silf as thei wolden bere hem and gouerne hem, if thilk thing were God hem silf’; 
indeed, if God were Himself visibly present, they could not make ‘meker or louȝer [lower, 
humbler] or deuouter submission’.100 For Pecock, however, this is precisely the point. Since 
contiguity between imagination’s images and physical ones results in an approximation of 
Christ’s presence – He is, in some way, really present – then the desire to touch mouth, eye and 
                                                          
97 On traditional emphasis on the visual in scholarship, see Gayk, Image, Text, and Religious Reform, 
p. 167; Suzannah Biernoff, ‘Carnal Relations: Embodied Sight in Merleau-Ponty, Roger Bacon 
and St Francis’, Journal of Visual Culture, 4.1 (2005), 39-52 e.g. at p. 40. Liz James, ‘“Seeing is 
believing, but feeling’s the truth”: Touch and the Meaning of Byzantine Art’, notes: ‘Scholars 
tend to treat religious services as essentially visual elements in which congregations function as 
spectators…Worship, however, is a participatory act and so touch plays as great a role as vision’, 
p. 9. 
98 Jacqueline E. Jung, ‘The Tactile and the Visionary: Notes on the Place of Sculpture in the 
Medieval Religious Imagination’, Looking Beyond: Visions, Dreams, and Insights in Medieval Art and 
History, ed. Colum Hourihane (Princeton: Index of Christian Art, 2010), pp. 203-40; Joanna E. 
Ziegler, Sculpture of Compassion: The Pietà and the Beguines in the Southern Low Countries c1300-c1600 
(Brussels: Brepols, 1992), e.g. p. 64. See also the essays collected in Sculpture and Touch, ed. Peter 
Dent (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014) for the long tradition associated sculpture with touch. 
99 Caroline Walker Bynum, Christian Materiality: An Essay on Religion in Late Medieval Europe (New 
York: Zone Books, 2015), p. 24. 
100 Repressor, p. 202. 
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hand to that of the physical image logically follows. If a reader thus finds friendship a persuasive 
paradigm for legitimising looking at images of Christ, so too, Pecock argues, will it justify 
touching images of Him. 
Imagine, Pecock urges his reader, Christ were walking on earth in a great crowd of 
people, 
and thou myзtist come so nyз that thou schuldist touche with thin hond hise feet or his 
hond his breste or his cheke or hise clothis, and woldist therbi gendre to thee bi so 
myche the more affeccioun anentis him than if thou myзtist not so touche him or his 
clothing, (euen riзt as we han experience that oon persoon gendrith more loue to an 
other, if he biclippe him in armys, than he schulde, if he not come so nyз to him and not 
biclippid him,)—it muste nedis folewe, if thou ymagine Crist or an other Seint for to be 
bodili streiзt thoruзout the bodi of the ymage, that thou schalt gendre, gete, and haue bi 
so miche the more good affeccioun to God or to the Seint, that thou dost to him 
touching him in the ymage as bi ymaginacioun.101 
Thomas emphasises in the Summa: ‘charity grows, not by one charity being added to another, but 
by being intensified in its subject’.102 Here, Pecock reminds us yet again that such intensification 
of charity is most profoundly achieved in touch: a person engenders more love for another if he 
‘biclippe [embrace] him in armys’ than if he merely sees him. In emphasising the connection of 
touch and love (and so, by extension, of touch and caritas), Pecock suppresses other reasons to 
touch images, such as healing or to obtain holy properties or virtues.103 More particularly, 
Pecock’s ‘imagine this’ instance recalls the Gospel account of the woman suffering a ‘flux of 
blood’, who, standing in a crowd, dares to reach out and touch the hem of Christ’s clothing in 
                                                          
101 Repressor, p. 271. 
102 Summa theologiae, see 2a2æ.24, 5 (Gilby, XXXIV, 48-9). 
103 See further on touch’s transformative potential, for example, C. M. Woolgar, The Senses in Late 
Medieval England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 29. 
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the hope that she might be healed.104 The healing potential of touching Christ’s clothes (via an 
image of Christ) is here sidestepped. Instead, Pecock stresses again the proximity necessary to 
the energy of friendship. Acknowledging that Christ’s presence would generate a desire to touch 
Him leads us to accept that the perception of presence (achieved through the process of 
mapping an interior image onto an exterior one) would likewise make us want to reach out and 
touch the physical representation. So important and so natural is this point for Pecock that he 
makes recourse not to one but three further illustrations from the paradigm of friendship, each 
of which is compelling in its affective charge.  
First comes Pecock’s boldest analogy: with the desire of those who love each other to be 
joined as one. Pecock invokes this analogy following on from the example of friendship being 
maintained at a distance and in absence through intermediaries: 
thou woldist be weel plesid, if thi freend, whom thou louest and which loueth thee, 
wolde sende to the a cosse [kiss] or an handling or a biclipping or eny other bodili 
touching bi a meene persoon receyuyng thilk cosse, handling, biclipping, or othere 
touching of him immediatli, and delyueryng to thee as fro him mediatli. 
Just as a man derives pleasure from receiving a kiss, an embrace or another bodily touch ‘bi  a 
meene person’, who first receives it and then delivers it ‘mediatli’, so too is it ‘coueitable’, Pecock 
argues, for a man to obtain through an image a touch (with his face, eyes or mouth) of the feet, 
mouth, hand or breast of Christ. The use of the material image as a proxy for physical presence 
is thus explained as natural: 
namelich sithen the nature of loue bitwixe persones [is] forto be a moving in to oonyng 
and ioynyng tho persoones to gidere, in so miche that if tho persoones miзten make 
euereither of hem forto entre into the ful hool person of the other of hem and forto be 
                                                          
104 The account is given in Matthew 9, Mark 5 and Luke 8. 
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streiзt thoruз out the bodi or person of the other of hem, than were had a greet entent 
and purpos into which her loue enclyneth.105 
By this point in the imaginative process that makes the external image contiguous with the 
imagined Christ we have moved far from mapping or stretching and far from optical lines, into a 
physical overlaying and ‘entering into’ of bodies: love for another inclines one to desire to touch 
and to match – more than this, collapse – every part of one’s own body into the other’s.106  
With this powerful example, a reader might ask why Pecock thought two more were 
necessary. He next sketches a profoundly beautiful instance from the friendship paradigm of 
parent and child: ‘if a man loue a child,’ he notes, ‘he wole sette his cheke to the cheke of the 
child, his iзe to the childis iзe, his forhede to the childis forhede, his nose to the childis nose, and 
therbi the more loue is gendrid anentis the child’. Through this example, I suggest, Pecock seeks 
both to assert the naturalness of the desire to touch and to cut off the potentially dangerous 
suggestion of the erotic in his assertion that the love between friends, as modelled in medieval 
accounts of spiritual friendship, inclines them to union. Such distancing is underscored in 
Pecock’s final example that comes from the paradigm of the lord and servant: is it not also the 
case, he asks, that a man who is loved particularly by a lord ‘mai be admyttid for to come so nyз 
that he lie with the lord in oon bed? And if he mai not be admyttid into so greet nyзnes, зit if he 
mai be admittid for to ligge in the same chambir with the lord, certis therbi schal good loue and 
affeccioun be gendrid’. With this last excessive example, Pecock thus seems to hope (though we 
might judge that he fails) to rein in the excess of affect that his insistence on the validity of 
touching an image of Christ has provoked. If the desire for presence experienced through touch 
is universal to love in all its forms, as is implied by Pecock’s examples taken from the friendship 
                                                          
105 Repressor, pp. 271-2. On the role in Thomas’s account of the apprehension of species in 
effecting a union between those who love each other, Summa theologiae, 1a2æ.28. 
106 Here Pecock seems to be drawing on the notion of the friend as another self, developed in 
monastic traditions of spiritual friendship, rather than sexual union, though this too is a possible 
interpretation. On the friend as a another self in monastic traditions, see Krahmer, ‘The Friend 
as a “Second Self”’. 
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of lord and servant, of father and child and between equals, then meeting the difficult demands 
of caritas might also legitimately require it. 
Pecock’s sustained engagement with the figure of the absent friend in his defence of the 
use of images in the Repressor thus very clearly shows that what is at stake (for him) is the 
problem Christ’s absence causes for sensory perception and for imagination. In pursuing the 
logic of friendship with Christ, Pecock shows the debate about images not only to be about 
vision, or about ways of seeing, but also about touch, and about the imaginative practices that 
should engage these sensory processes. In his insistent return to the imaginative process in which 
Christ is ‘streiзt thoruзout the bodi of the ymage’, Pecock establishes not only a sense of touch 
but an actual experience of touch as the grounds for approximating presence. Since Christ is 
absent, imagining touching Him is the next best thing to His real presence, but imagination 
(under the feeble conditions of the human mind) needs physical images. If, when viewing and 
simultaneously touching an image, a man maps the imagined image onto the physical one, the 
sense of touch gives real solidity to imagining – making vividly present Christ the friend. 
